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Foreword 
The next major boost to world trade is  expected to come from  greater trade in 
services. And this is possible only when greater liberalization in services is achieved which 
in turn depends on the progress that WTO members make in terms of higher commitments 
in different rounds of WTO negotiations. As this happens, subsidy practices of various 
member countries will increasingly come under sharp public scanner. 
 
Unlike agricultural and manufactured goods for which subsidy rules or disciplines 
are already well developed in the WTO, in services these rules/disciplines are yet to be 
developed. Developing subsidy rules in services pose a major challenge because of the 
various channels through which trade in services takes place and also because of basic 
framework of trade in services (General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS)) already 
developed in the WTO. 
 
This  paper  brings  out  the  complexity  of  issues  that  come  up  while  developing 
subsidy disciplines for services. What adds to this complexity is almost non-availability of 
information about the various subsidy practices of member countries  
 
This paper discusses whatever limited evidence is available in this regard and draws 
some  broad  guidelines  that  can  help  in  the  development  of  subsidies  framework.  The 








   1 
Executive Summary 
According to the guidelines and procedures for the negotiations on trade in services, 
among  other  things,  negotiations  on  subsidies  should  conclude  before  negotiations 
concerning specific commitments are completed. However, progress on developing subsidy 
discipline is tardy. Most member countries have not yet even furnished information on the 
subsidy programs that they maintain in service sectors. Whatever limited evidence that is 
available suggests that subsidies to various services sectors are fairly widespread, and so 
are the forms that such subsidies take. At present there are no effective subsidy disciplines 
in the general agreement on trade in services (GATS). Subsidy disciplines are necessary to 
encourage  members  from  making  greater  commitments,  which  in  turn  is  necessary  for 
achieving higher trade in services. Subsidy disciplines in services would be particularly 
beneficial to developing countries that have considerable benefits to reap from trade in 
services, have limited capacity to subsidise, and would anyway stand to gain exemptions 
from certain subsidy provisions as and when these provisions are developed.  
 
The basic difference between trading in goods and trading in services on the one 
hand and the difference in the design of goods agreement (GATT) and services agreement 
(GATS) on the other limit the scope of applying subsidy provisions developed in goods 
case.  Further,  certain  peculiarities  of  and  complexities  in  trade  in  services  give  rise  to 
additional complications that a subsidy framework needs to grapple with. 
 
While GATS provide considerable flexibility to member countries in liberalizing 
their services sectors, the national treatment obligation (which restricts ability of member 
countries  from  treating  foreign  service  providers  differently  from  the  domestic  service 
suppliers) discourages member countries from providing subsidies. Nevertheless, there is a 
need to develop subsidy disciplines. Subsidy disciplines, as and when they are developed, 
should  address  only  those  measures  that  qualify  as  subsidies.  Public  measures  such  as 
regulatory  policies  and/or  practices  of  monopolies  and  exclusive  service  providers  that 
generate  subsidy-like  effect  need  to  be  addressed  separately  from  those  arising  due  to 
subsidies.  Therefore,  any  attempt  to  develop  subsidies  framework  needs  to  focus  on 
distortions due to subsidies alone.   2 
In  thinking  about  subsidies  framework  in  GATS,  it  is  useful  to  examine  the 
applicability of agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures (ASCM) to services 
case. The subsidy definition in ASCM (namely, financial contribution by the government 
leading to conferral of benefit) seems useful in services case as well; so is the definition of 
specificity. The idea that non-specific subsidies i.e., subsidies available more generally, are 
non-trade distortionary is valid in services too. 
 
However, disciplines on specific subsidies based on their trade distortionary effect 
would differ in services. Unlike goods case where trade takes place only through cross 
border  movement  (i.e.,  Mode  1),  trade  in  services  can  additionally  take  place  when 
consumers move abroad (Mode 2) or when service supplier sets up a base in foreign market 
(Mode 3) or when labour, both skilled and semi-skilled, temporarily move abroad (Mode 
4). This has some implications: one, trade flows become relatively complex; and, the link 
between trade distortion and competition distortion is no longer clear cut, two, trade within 
the domestic territory of a member country can occur much more than in case of goods; 
and so is the possibility of subsidy-induced trade distortion within the domestic territory of 
subsidizing country than in other member countries. As a result, the distinction between 
export  subsidy  and  production  subsidy  becomes  difficult,  even  if  it  is  still  useful. 
Furthermore, given considerable cross-linkages across services sectors, invisibility of many 
types of service transactions, practical difficulties involved in calculating subsidy margins, 
and limited scope of remedy by way of countervailing duties, it is prudent, as a general 
principal, to ban on all subsidy practices. At the same time, the need for achieving public 
policy goals call for having a “positive list approach” that provides certain derogations 
from the general principal of ban or prohibition. These derogations or exceptions could be 
to achieve certain well defined social and cultural, environmental, and development goals. 
Such an approach can take care of many of the challenges that come up in the design of 
subsidy provisions in services such as competition distortion across modes or across sub-
sectors or a service supplier located abroad and supplying service through cross border 
movement  facing  unfair  competition  in  the  market  where  domestic  suppliers  are 
subsidized. There is strong relationship between public services provided in exercise of   3 
governmental authority (i.e., Article I:3(b)) and public policy goals for which subsidies are 
allowed.  
 
One possible way to dealing with the issue is to leave the scope of public services 
open, and let the members decide what services they would treat as basic services, which 
should eventually get reflected in their commitments in GATS, and then treat the issue of 
subsidies to social sectors not very different from other service sectors in the subsidies 
agreement. Another possible way is to tighten the scope of I:3(b), and then leave large 
enough room in subsidies agreement to enable member countries achieve their legitimate 
social objectives through subsidies in these sectors. 
 
Indeed, the European community has adopted the “positive list approach” that has 
been tested for the past several years. While this “positive list approach” would be possible 
in  a  full  blown  subsidy  framework  which  would  take  some  time  to  develop,  in  the 
meantime it is probably a good idea to identify and limit those subsidies that are viewed to 
be the most trade distortionary. One type of trade distortion that has necessitated the need 
for having some subsidy  disciplines is the undermining of market access commitments 
especially in a “third country market” due to subsidy practices of member countries. 
 
All  discretionary  and  ad  hoc  subsidies  given  to  the  infrastructure  services 
(telecommunications, financial and transport sectors) that go as input into the production of 
other goods and services need to be disciplined as priority. So are certain sector specific 
subsidies given, for example, to tourism sector that is known to receive significant financial 
support from governments, and has a clearer bearing on trade. Similarly, subsidies that 
encourage the use of domestic inputs (both goods and services) over imported inputs must 
be taken up on a priority basis. Also subsidies that are specifically targeted at firms/sectors 
known  for  their  foreign  exchange  potential  ought  to  be  zeroed  in  first.  Likewise, 
consumption subsidies that are linked to purchase decision could also be focused in the 
initial disciplines. Sectors in which member countries have made greater commitment can 
be  targeted  first.  Whether  the  subsidy  disciplines  developed  in  the  interim  need  to  be 
applied  only  to  the  sectors  and  the  members  that  have  made  commitments  or  whether   4 
subsidy disciplines need to be applied more generally even to those sectors and members 
that have not been committed remains an open issue. In the absence of good information on 
various subsidy practices of member countries, it is difficult to make progress on subsidy 


























   5 
Introduction ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗  
As  in  goods  case,  subsidy  can  be  an  important  source  of  distortion  of  trade  in 
services. But subsidy is not the only source of distortion. Domestic regulatory policies as 
well  as  practices  of  monopolies  and  exclusive  service  providers  can  have  subsidy-like 
effect. Ideally, subsidy disciplines should form a part of broader system of controls over all 
forms  of  intervention  including  regulation  and  direct  public  provision  in  the  economy 
(OECD  2001).  But  given  the  GATS  reality,  distortions  due  to  regulatory  policies  and 
monopoly practices need to be addressed separately from those arising due to subsidies. 
Therefore, any attempt to develop subsidies framework needs to focus on distortions due to 
subsidies alone. 
 
The  basic  motivation  behind  subsidy  disciplines  in  service  is  to  provide  level 
playing field for all service providers, irrespective of where they are located, and in all 
modes of supply. Subsidy disciplines under GATS are needed to make progress on service 
negotiations which are necessary for achieving greater liberalization of trade in services 
that is expected to be even more beneficial than (further) liberalization of merchandise 
trade.  Subsidy  agreement  would  be  particularly  beneficial  to  developing  countries,  as 
Sauve  (2001)  notes,  “Developing  countries  should  be  active  demandeurs  of  subsidy 
disciplines  in  services  negotiations  given  their  limited  capacity  to  provide  subsidy 
compared to the developed countries.” Developing countries may not have a big share of 
services today except perhaps in certain sectors such as tourism and transportation. But 
they  are  moving  up  the  value-added  chain  in  services  supply  (UNCTAD  1999).  As 
developing countries progress on this, they may gradually overtake developed countries in 
certain lines of services, depending on their comparative advantages---the trend observed in 
goods trade. Absence of subsidy disciplines can be a major stumbling block to achieving 
such a trend. 
 
Before  thinking  through  the  issues  in  subsidies  in  services,  it  is  instructive  to 
examine how trade in goods is different from trade in services. Unlike trade in goods that 
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mostly  occurs  through  cross  border  movement  (i.e.,  Mode  1),  trade  in  services  can 
additionally occur through three other modes: consumption abroad (Mode 2), commercial 
presence (Mode 3), and movement of nature persons (Mode 4). Because trade in services 
can occur through other channels or modes, trade flows become a bit more complicated 
(see  Figure  1  and  2).  One  major  implication  of  this  is  that  the  possibility  of  subsidy-
induced trade distortions in the domestic market of subsidizing member country is much 
more in services than in the goods case. Moreover, the GATS architecture itself is quite 
different from that of GATT. Therefore, subsidy disciplines in services have to be different 
from  those  in  case  of  goods.  Before  discussing  subsidies,  let’s  examine  the  main 
differences between the GATT and GATS. 
 
Although  the  basic  objective  and  the  principles  behind  both  these  agreements 
(GATT  and GATS) are the same namely to reduce trade barriers and  to practice non-
discrimination, the two agreements are framed quite differently. The difference in the two 
frameworks  partly  reflects  the  fact  that  trading  in  goods  is  different  from  trading  in 
services,  and  is  partly  conditioned  by  the  necessity  of  making  the  services  agreement 
agreeable to the member countries, some of whom were reluctant to the inclusion of trade 
in services during the Uruguay Round. There are, of course, many differences between the 
two agreements. The main differences of interest here are outlined below. 
 
Merchandise  trade  involves  only  one  type  of  transaction  i.e.,  cross  border 
movement and only one legitimate instrument of protection i.e., tariffs. Trade in services, 
on the other hand, involve four different types of transactions (categorized in terms of four 
different modes) and two different sets of negotiable trade obligations, namely, 'market 
access' and 'national treatment'. The negotiable trade obligations include six different types 
of market access restrictions and a virtually unlimited range of conceivable departures from 
national treatment. 
 
The fact that these two different sets of trade obligations are negotiable, implies that 
GATS  allow  member  countries  considerable  flexibility  in  terms  of  undertaking  sector-
specific access obligations as well as scheduling commitments that can be inscribed mode-  7 
wise and to which broad range of limitations over and above existing market conditions can 
be  applied.  The  'bottom-up'  approach  to  the  undertaking  of  sector-specific  access 
obligations in GATS implies that nothing is bound that is not included in commitments. 
This feature allows considerable flexibility to member countries in comparison to GATT 
where a negative-list approach is adopted, implying everything is bound unless explicitly 
excluded (for other differences see Adlung 2004, Adlung and Roy 2005). 
 
These  two  basic  features  of  GATS  agreement  pose  considerable  challenge  to 
framing subsidies discipline in services. Besides, there are other issues in services trade that 
add complexity and challenge to designing a subsidies framework. The fact that trade in 
services can take place through four different modes gives rise to the issue of subsidy-
induced distortion in any one mode affecting competition in the same service provided 
through another mode. Moreover, given the nature of certain services, the role of public 
policy is much more pronounced in services than in case of goods. Furthermore, diverse 
service sectors in GATS
1, with each sector having some sectoral specificities, considerable 
cross-linkages, and the issues of transparency add considerable complexity to developing 
subsidy disciplines in services. Before discussing these complexities in some detail, let’s 
examine the potential reach of the existing disciplines in matters of subsidies. 
 
Existing GATS Disciplines 
 
While the need for having subsidy disciplines in services is well recognized, the 
GATS rules currently have minimal disciplines on subsidies. GATS article on subsidies 
(Article XV), as it stands today, is more of an expression of the collective thinking of 
member countries on the subject rather than an attempt to impose disciplines. For example, 
GATS recognises that in certain circumstances subsidies may have distortive effects on 
trade in services. Accordingly, GATS mandates that members shall enter into negotiations 
with  a  view  to  developing  the  necessary  multilateral  disciplines  to  avoid  such  trade-
distortive effects. At the same time, GATS recognizes subsidies to be important policy tool 
for achieving national development goals. Hence, the subsidy disciplines in services, as and 
when they are developed, should seek to control trade related subsidy measures, and in case 
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of non-trade related measures, the subsidy disciplines should only cover their incidental 
effects on trade. It also makes it incumbent upon members to share information on the 
subsidies that are being given to services sectors. If a subsidy practice of any member 
country adversely affects any other member, the affected member can seek consultation 
under Article XV. However, this provision does not specify what the consulted member is 
required to do in case the country requesting the consultations is able to show that it is 
adversely affected. Hence, the consultative process under GATS is more or less ineffective. 
 
Besides  Article  XV,  five  other  GATS  articles  that  have  a  bearing  on  subsidy 
practices are: the MFN clause (Article II), the NT clause (Article XVII), market access 
(Article XVI), additional commitments (Article XVIII), consultations on subsidies (Article 
XV (2)), and non-violation nullification or impairment (Article XXIII (3)).
2 We briefly 
discuss the relevant portion of these articles below. 
 
The MFN clause that deals with most favoured nation treatment tends to discipline 
subsidies by making it mandatory for a member country giving subsidies to foreign service 
suppliers  from  some  countries  to  extend  such  subsidies  to  foreign  suppliers  from  all 
countries.  However, diluting measures such as the option not to grant subsidies to foreign 
service  suppliers  at  all,  or  to  schedule  MFN  exemption,  partially  offset  these  potential 
disciplining effects. 
 
Similarly, national treatment obligation makes it mandatory for a member country 
to extend subsidy to all foreign suppliers located in the domestic territory of a member 
country if such subsidies are available to domestic service suppliers and the country has not 
sought subsidy limitation under national treatment. The obligation to grant service subsidy 
to foreign like firms inhibits the desire to grant the subsidy to national service firms. Most 
members  have  included  limitations  on  national  treatment  that  apply  horizontally  to  all 
services subsidies. 
 
                                                 
2 For these GATS Articles refer Benitah (2004) from which we have drawn heavily.   9 
Market  access  commitments  are  the  necessary  condition  for  the  existence  of 
previous disciplining effects through MFN and NT clauses. Thus, the disciplining effect of 
the  NT  and  MFN  clauses  on  services  subsidies  is  de  facto  toothless  in  all  sectors  not 
included in the schedule of commitments. 
 
GATS  Article  XX(1)(c)  allows  members  to  make  additional  commitments  in 
sectors where specific commitments have been made. According to Benitah 2004, “This 
provision could theoretically allow the request and offer of commitments to bind, reduce, 
remove or otherwise discipline services subsidies in the additional commitments column of 
members’ schedules. In practice, no country has used this option.” 
Another GATS Article that has a bearing on subsidy practices is Article XXIII (3) 
which stipulates that if a member considers that any benefit it could reasonably expect to 
accrue (from specific commitment of another member) is being nullified or impaired as a 
result, for example, of a particular subsidy, it may have recourse to the dispute settlement 
process. According to Benitah 2004, “Since information on services subsidies is at this 
moment  opaque  for  most  countries,  it  would  be  surprising  to  see  a  WTO  panel  take 
seriously the argument that such a subsidy was really unexpected at the time when specific 
commitments were made.” 
 
Furthermore,  Benitah  2004  notes,  “All  current  tools  offered  by  the  GATS  for 
disciplining subsidies are inherently limited as their bite is largely dependent on individual 
members’ foresight and bargaining power.” 
 
Complexities in Developing Subsidy Framework 
 
Since the current GATS provisions have limited effect on subsidies a need for full 
blown subsidy framework is felt. There is already a significant body of literature that brings 
out the range and complexity of issues involved in developing subsidy and also sheds some 
light on what the essential elements could be in any modest beginning towards developing 
subsidy disciplines. We discuss some of these complexities below: 
   10 
  Modal distinction: While members make commitments under different modes, trade 
distortion in one mode where a member has not made any commitment can easily alter 
conditions of competition under another mode in which the member has actually made 
commitments. Difficulty in handing this issue has given rise to what is called likeness of 
service and likeness of service providers. The definition of likeness cuts across different 
modes and poses a challenge when dealing with subsidies.
3 The issue here is well summed 
up in Mattoo (1997): “If "likeness" of a service were defined independent of the mode of 
supply, then there would be built-in protection within the Agreement for foreign suppliers 
of services through all modes against national subsidization. In effect, if a Member were to 
subsidize its own service or service supplier, the national treatment obligation would make 
it necessary to provide an "equivalent" subsidy to the services of other Members supplied 
within its territory, irrespective of the mode of supply.  Otherwise, it could be argued that 
the subsidy had modified the conditions of competition in favour of services or service 
suppliers of the Member.  On the other hand, if likeness were held to depend on the mode 
of  supply  (as  the  structure  of  schedules  suggests),  then  foreign  suppliers  through  a 
particular mode may not be protected against national subsidization.  In this case, there 
would be a gap in the current disciplines which may need to be remedied.” 
 
Public  policy  objectives:  Public  services  provided  in  exercise  of  governmental 
authority, not on a commercial basis and not in competition with other service suppliers, is 
excluded  from  GATS  disciplines  under  Article  I:3  (b).  However,  the  understanding  on 
what constitutes a basic public service has not been reached among member countries. The 
reason for this is not difficult to see. In any country the range and level of public services is 
the result of history, varying social and political values, and differing notions of appropriate 
role of the state (Krajewski 2001). Hence, the extent of public services varies from country 
to country. In healthcare service, for example, Europe has a strong tradition of public health 
systems which is financed through taxes or through mandatory insurance while in the US 
private  provision  of  healthcare  is  fairly  strong.  What  is  observed  in  healthcare  is  also 
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become arguable whether a member who scheduled an NT limitation in mode 3 for subsidies granted to its 
domestic supplier but committed full NT in mode 1 and 2, might be in breach of its NT obligation if the 
subsidies changed the conditions for competition for foreign suppliers supplying services in mode 1 and 2.   11 
observed in other services such as education, water, environmental services, energy supply 
and  so  forth.  Therefore,  the  scope  of  GATS  agreement  depends  on  whether  or  not  a 
particular service constitutes a basic public service. This in turn depends on how the notion 
of “a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority” is understood. At present, 
for a service to qualify as basic public service it must meet two conditions: it must neither 
be supplied on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or more service suppliers. If 
a service is provided on non-commercial basis but in competition with one or more service 
suppliers or on a commercial basis but without competition, it is not a service supplied in 
exercise  of  governmental  authority.  The  scope  of  the  GATS  thus  depends  on  an 
understanding  of  the  notions  “supplied  on  a  commercial  basis”  and  “supplied  in 
competition with one or more services suppliers”. 
 
The  scope  of  the  agreement  is  also  relevant  if  the  member  has  made  specific 
commitments  concerning  market  access  and  national  treatment.  If  a  service  is  covered 
under the scope of GATS all horizontal disciplines (such as Article II, MFN, or Article III, 
transparency) apply to it. 
 
Although, the discussions in the WTO have brought greater clarity on this issue, the 
final decision is yet to be reached. For example, the background note on postal and courier 
services prepared by the council for trade in services, the secretariat stated “There might be 
a relation between postal services provided by wholly government entities and the GATS 
Article I provision excluding government functions. Postal services of a member, whatever 
the status of the postal supplier, would be services covered by the GATS as long as, and 
which his usually the case, they are supplied on a commercial basis.” 
 
In  case  of  legal  services  the  secretariat  held  that  “the  administration  of  justice 
(judges, court, clerks, public prosecutors, state advocates, etc.) (…) is effectively excluded 
from the scope of the GATS as in most countries it is considered a ‘service supplied in 
exercise of governmental authority’ according to Article I:3 (b) of the Agreement.” 
    12 
In the background note on health and social services the secretariat concludes “that 
the hospital sector in many countries, however, is made up of government-and-privately-
owned  entities  which  both  operate  on  a  commercial  basis,  charging  the  patient  or  his 
insurance for the treatment provided. Supplementary subsidies may be granted for social, 
regional  and  similar  policy  purposes.  It  seems  unrealistic  in  such  cases  to  argue  for 
continued application of Article 1:3 and/or maintain that no competitive relationship exists 
between the two groups of suppliers or services.” 
 
As  we  shall  see  later,  social  services  typically  receive  considerable  government 
support  that  would  easily  qualify  as  subsidies.  Whether  subsidy  discipline  should  be 
applicable to these services would depend on their scope in the GATS as well as their 
treatment in the subsidies agreement.
4 
 
One possible way to dealing with the issue of public policy goals is to leave the 
scope of basic public services open, and let the members decide what services they would 
treat  as  basic  services,  which  should  eventually  get  reflected  in  their  commitments  in 
GATS, and then treat the issue of subsidies to social sectors not very different from other 
service sectors in the subsidies agreement. Another possible way is to tighten the scope of 
I:3(b),  and  then  leave  large  enough  room  in  subsidies  agreement  to  enable  member 
countries achieve their legitimate social objectives through subsidies in these sectors. 
 
National treatment obligation: The national treatment obligation tends to impose 
significant  disciplines  on  member  countries  in  checking  against  the  proliferation  or 
prevalence of subsidies in services sectors.
5 Although national treatment can substantially 
discipline  trade  distortion  in  the  domestic  territory  of  a  member  country,  it  cannot 
                                                 
4 Also, Article XIII exempts the application of Articles II, XVI and XVII to government procurement i.e., 
procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for governmental purposes in pursuit of non-
commercial goals. 
5 In GATT, national treatment is concerned with measures affecting products per se and is applied across the 
board. In comparison to GATT, national treatment obligation under GATS is wider in scope (as the domain 
of  national  treatment  obligation  in  the  includes  not  only  measures  affecting  services  products,  but  also 
measures affecting service suppliers) but it is more limited in application because it applies only to scheduled 
sectors, and there too may be subject to limitations. Also, in GATS, subsidies are automatically subject to 
national treatment disciplines in scheduled sectors unless limitations have been scheduled. GATT, however, 
exempts production subsidies from national treatment.   13 
discipline  all  kinds  of  subsidy-induced  trade  distortions  in  the  domestic  territory  of  a 
subsidising  member  country  or  in  the  third  country.  In  particular,  it  leaves  open  the 
following possibilities: 
 
(i)  Service supplier located outside domestic territory 
(ii)  Consumption support linked to domestic supplier 
(iii)  Subsidizing specialized skills of nationals 
 
(i)  Supposing a Member has bound itself to provide national treatment under all four 
modes in a particular sector, and that the member provides subsidy to all national 
service  providers.  Is  the  member  obliged  to  extend  the  subsidy  to  the  service 
suppliers located abroad who faces unfair competition in the domestic market of 
subsiding  member  country?  The  Explanatory  Note  clarifies,  to  an  extent,  the 
territorial  scope  of  the  national  treatment  obligation.    Paragraph  10  of  the 
Explanatory Note states that: 
 
"There is no obligation in the GATS which  requires a Member to take measures 
outside  its  territorial  jurisdiction.    It  therefore  follows  that  the  national  treatment 
obligation in Article XVII does not require a Member to extend such treatment to a 
service supplier located in the territory of another Member." 
 
According to Mattoo (1997), “This would seem to imply, for example, that a Member 
is not obliged to extend a subsidy provided to suppliers located in its territory to 
suppliers  located  outside  its  territory.    It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the 
Explanatory Note addresses specifically the treatment of suppliers and does not deal 
with issues that may arise in relation to the treatment of services - especially with 
respect to the cross-border supply of a service, when the service is supplied within the 
territory of a Member while the supplier is located outside it.” 
 
Any subsidy provided under modes 3 or 4, for example, would have an impact also 
on competitive conditions under mode 1, because cross border suppliers would be   14 
competing against subsidized local services.  Thus, the issue here is on how to ensure 
non-discriminatory conditions for suppliers through all modes.  
 
(ii)  Another  issue  that  needs  to  be  addressed  relates  to  consumption  subsidies. 
Consumption  subsidies  given  to  residents  are  non-trade  distortionary.  However, 
when such subsidies are linked to purchase from a national supplier, they tend to 
distort  trade.  It  does  not  matter  whether  the  resident  is located  within domestic 
territory or located abroad. When a subsidy is granted for consumption abroad and 
it is linked to purchase from a national supplier located abroad or conditional on 
purchase in a particular country, it once again, gives rise to the tension between the 
notion of territory and wider notions of jurisdiction. 
 
  There  may  be  no  obligation  in  the  GATS  which  requires  a  Member  to  take 
measures outside its territorial jurisdiction (as paragraph 10 of the Explanatory Note 
states), but if a Member does take such measures, is it free to act as it chooses - or 
should  there  be  an  obligation  to  take  such  measures  consistently  with  GATS 
principles?
6  Mattoo 1997 observes that in the absence of such an interpretation, 
there is a danger that the national treatment (and MFN) obligations would have 
limited value with respect to consumption abroad. 
 
(iii)   In addition, other form of subsidy that can distort trade both within and outside 
domestic  territory  is  subsidy  given  to  residents  for  acquiring  specialised  skills. 
When  the  residents,  armed  with  specialized  skills  that  are  subsidized  by 
government, temporarily move abroad the subsidy causes distortion. At present this 
distortion  is  limited,  if  at  all,  since  the  members  countries  usually  have  strict 
immigration/visa regulations. But even when there is no temporary movement of 
natural persons, subsidized specialized skills may distort trade when, for example, 
outsourcing of services to the subsidizing member takes place via mode 1. 
                                                 
6Unlike in GATT, export subsidies are not prohibited in GATS, but a Member who had committed to provide 
national treatment would also be obliged to provide such subsidies to all foreign producers with commercial 
presence in its territory.  However, would the obligation affect a Member who provides the subsidy to its   15 
Even if the above channels through which trade distortion takes place are addressed, 
trade  distortion  may  still  occur  if  one  of  the  sub-sectors  is  subsidized  or  when  any 
particular mode is subsidized. So a full blown subsidy disciplines should check against 
cross-(sub)  sectoral  and  cross  modal  trade  distortion,  even  when  such  subsidies  in  a 
specific mode or specific sub-sector are available to both domestic and foreign service 
suppliers. 
Subsidy  disciplines  ought  to  address  these  channels  of  subsidy-induced  trade 
distortions. 
 
Towards developing subsidy disciplines in GATS 
 
Under GATS rules, member countries have full flexibility in terms of what sectors 
to  schedule  and  what  limitations  to  seek  both  under  market  access  and  under  national 
treatment obligations. Any subsidy framework (whatever form it takes) should uphold this 
basic  spirit  of  GATS  i.e.,  should  be  applicable  only  to  those  sectors  that  have  been 
scheduled and in which a member country has not sought any limitations to subsidies under 
national  treatment.  In  other  words,  if  a  member  country  has  not  scheduled  a  sector  or 
having  scheduled  a  sector  sought  limitation  to  subsidies  under  national  treatment,  the 
subsidy disciplines should not apply to the member country in that particular sector. At any 
given time, the fact that the levels of commitments under different sectors vary from one 
member country to another imply that the extent to which subsidies disciplines would be 
binding on each member country may be different. 
 
Applicability of ASCM 
 
The literature compares subsidy disciplines under General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariff  (GATT),  and  the  possible  subsidy  disciplines  under  GATS.  It  is  instructive  to 
examine the extent to which the subsidy disciplines under GATT (i.e., ASCM) can be 
useful in designing disciplines in the context of GATS. In understanding the applicability 
of ASCM provisions to subsidy disciplines under GATS, it is to be borne in mind that the 
GATT architect is quite different from that of GATS. 
                                                                                                                                                    
producer located outside its territory?  Could  we argue that the Member,  having chosen to act outside its 
territory, should be obliged to act in a manner consistent with its obligations under the GATS?   16 
 
In case of ASCM, the definition of subsidy is generic and unrelated to the concept 
of  trade  distortion.  A  measure  is  called  subsidy,  under  ASCM,  if  it  takes  the  form  of 
financial contribution, by the government, leading to conferral of benefit. The link between 
a subsidy measure and trade distortion is established by the concept of specificity i.e., only 
those subsidies that are specific in nature are considered to be trade distortionary and hence 
liable for action under certain conditions. On the contrary, subsidies that are available more 
generally  (i.e.,  non-specific  subsidies)  are  not  considered  troublesome  from  a  trade 
perspective  and,  hence,  are  considered  non-actionable.  Non-specific  subsidies  may  be 
given by a member country pursuing certain desirable social and/or economic goals. 
 
Furthermore, not all specific subsidies are troublesome to the same degree. Based 
on  the  nature  of  specific  subsidy,  ASCM  assumes  certain  subsidies  to  be  more  trade 
distortionary than others and for this reason has adopted traffic light approach with respect 
to all specific subsidies. As per this approach, export subsidies are assumed to be trade 
distortionary and hence are, in general, prohibited while the link between other specific 
subsidies and their trade distortionary role is less clear and therefore become actionable 
under certain circumstances. In other words, in GATT disciplines a distinction is made 
between (i) government actions having finality related to trade, and (ii) the effects on trade 
of government actions having a finality unrelated to trade. The immediate consequence of 
this is that only government actions falling into (i) can be in themselves subject to GATT 
disciplines whereas GATT rules cannot deal with government actions falling into (ii). They 
can only deal with their incidental effects on trade.
7 
 
The scope of actionable subsidies is well defined in the ASCM. A subsidy measure 
becomes  actionable  if  it  causes  adverse  effect  to  member  countries.  Adverse  effect 
includes: injury to domestic industry, nullification and impairment of benefits, and serious 
prejudice to members’ interest. 
 
                                                 
7 For more on this see Depayre and Petriccione 1991.   17 
It is instructive as this point to compare the services case with that of goods. In 
goods case, because trade takes place only through cross border movement, it is possible to 
distinguish between export subsidies and domestic subsidies that are specifically given, and 
developing  stricter  disciplines  (i.e.,  prohibiting)  on  export  subsidies  than  on  domestic 
subsidies (that are actionable). In case of services the distinction between export subsidies 
and domestic subsidies is non-tenable because trade in services can take place through 
other modes too. An important implication of this, as noted above, is that subsidy-induced 
trade distortions within domestic market of subsidizing member country can be much more 
than  in  case  of  goods  trade.  Therefore,  domestic  subsidies  can  be  as  much  trade 
distortionary  (if not more) than export subsidies in services. Fortunately, the design of 
GATS already tends to discipline subsidy distortion in the domestic territory of subsiding 
member  country  through  national  treatment.  Although  national  treatment  obligation 
imposes  considerable  discipline  on  subsidies,  it  does  not  address  all  channels  through 
which subsidy-induced trade distortion may happen. Even if national treatment is extended, 
there is still a need to limit subsidy because subsidy given to a sub-sector or to a service 
supplied  through  a  particular  mode  can  still  distort  competition  across  modes  or  sub-
sectors. It is instructive here to examine the European Commission (EC) approach in this 
regard. The EC has developed rules to government state aid, the term used for subsidy, 
among the member countries. 
 
If  all  subsidies,  as  a  rule,  are  prohibited  and  alongside  this  prohibition  rule  a 
positive list approach is followed wherein certain exceptions to the prohibition rule are 
permitted, all the complications cited above can be overcome. Indeed, this is the approach 
followed by the EC treaty on state aid.  
 
EC approach to subsidy in nutshell:  
 
According to EC, the core issue is whether subsidy, referred to as state aid in the 
EC  treaty,  distorted  competition,  and  not  just  whether  it  distorted  trade.  As  a  general 
principle  subsidy  is  banned  in  EC  because  it  distorts  competition  by  giving  some 
enterprises an advantage over others. The controls in the EC treaty focus only on financial 
assistance to firms, and only “in cases where some subset of firms is treated differently   18 
from the way firms are treated in the country as a whole.” This approach has the advantage 
of focusing on distortions to competition, which are most likely to be inefficient. However, 
the possibility existed that certain state aids be permitted by the commission. In this regard, 
a number of public policy objectives were exhaustively listed in the treaty. Provision was 
also made to ensure that the provision of services of general interest was not prevented. 
 
EC rules on state aid are applicable to goods and services alike. The definition of 
state aid is similar to that of subsidies in case of ASCM. For any measure to be regarded as 
state aid, it must qualify the following four conditions: (i) lead to transfer of resources from 
state (including national, regional or local authorities, public banks and foundations, etc.) 
(ii) would constitute an economic advantage that the undertaking would not have received 
in  the  normal  course  of  business  (iii)  is  selective  and  thus  affect  the  balance  between 
certain firms and their competitors. (iv) must have a potential effect on competition and 
trade between member states. Note that it is selectivity that differentiates State aid from so-
called general measures (e.g. most nation-wide fiscal measures). Potential effect of small 
levels of state aid (de minimis level) is considered limited and therefore kept outside the 
scope of the definition of state aid. 
 
State aid is in general considered incompatible with the common market. But the 
principle  of  incompatibility  does  not  amount  to  a  full-scale  prohibition.  The  Treaty 
specifies a number of cases in which State aid could be considered acceptable (the so-
called exemptions.).  However, member states must notify to the Commission any plan to 
grant state aid before putting such plan into effect. This gives the Commission the power to 
decide whether the proposed aid measure qualifies for exemption. 
 
State aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that it 
is  granted  without  discrimination  related  to  the  origin  of  the  products  concerned  is 
considered compatible. Likewise, aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters 
or exceptional occurrences is considered compatible. State aid may be acceptable if it is 
given  for  regional  development,  for  achieving  certain  well  defined  objectives  to  be 
achieved in any region/sector. Accordingly, there are rules for regional aid, horizontal rules   19 
and  sectoral  rules.  Regional  aid  is  given  to  improve  standard  of  living  or  remove 
underemployment  problem  in  regions  where  these  indicators  deviate  considerably  in 
comparison to EU average. Regional aid can also be given to facilitate the development of 
certain economic areas which are disadvantaged compared to the national average. 
 
On horizontal rules, the commission allows for particular categories of aid which 
are  aimed  at  tackling  problems  which  may  arise  in  any  industry  and  region.  These 
categories  are:  Aid  for  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises;  Aid  for  research  and 
development; Aid for environmental protection; Aid for the rescue and restructuring of 
firms in difficulty; Aid to employment, and Training aid. 
 
Besides, the Commission has adopted industry-specific or sectoral rules defining its 
approach  to  State  aid  in  particular  industries.  These  sectoral  rules  are  for  (i)  sensitive 
sectors (ii) agriculture and fisheries, and aquaculture (iii) transport sector.
8 
 
Member states are urged to redirect their aid towards horizontal objectives and to 
seek alternatives to state aid to address market failures. Prior notification of all state aid 
measures  or  schemes  to  the  commission  is  required.  However,  the  commission  is 
authorized to adopt regulations exempting certain categories of aid without the need for 
notification. Firms that receive aid that has not been notified to the commission may have 
to repay this aid if the commission decides that the aid is incompatible with the common 
interest. 
 
In WTO, subsidy rules under GATS need to follow positive list approach i.e., all 
subsidy to services, as a rule, should be prohibited. However, exceptions need to be made 
for certain well defined objectives. Here the approach suggested by Benitah 2004, sounds 
                                                 
8 Over the years, special rules have been adopted for a number of sectors which have experienced severe 
economic problems and which were therefore considered to be sensitive. As per the available report, the 
sensitive  sectors  are  the  coal  and  steel  industry,  synthetic  fibres  sector,  motor  vehicles  industry  and 
shipbuilding. The general state aid rules do not apply, or apply only to a limited extent in the sectors involved 
in the production and marketing of products of agriculture and fisheries, and aquaculture. Similarly, while in 
the road transport sector, most general State aid rules apply, these rules do not apply to other transport 
sectors (rail, air, inland waterways and maritime transport).   20 
promising. Benitah 2004 lists a number of public policy objectives which are categorized in 
to three heads: economic development, social development, and environmental objectives. 
One expects some relationship between the positive list and public services under Article 
I:3 (b). 
 
This approach is useful in developing full blown subsidy disciplines which may 
take some time to develop. Some of the contours of a full blown framework could be as 
follows: 
 
a)  As  in  case  of  ASCM,  it  is  desirable  to  de-link  the  subsidy  definition  from  the 
distortionary effect of subsidy measures; 
 
b)  The  subsidy  definition  given  ASCM  can  be  retained  as  it  is  general  enough  to 
capture all types of government financial support: budgetary and non-budgetary and 
implicit and explicit. (EU treaty adopts similar definition on State Aid); 
 
c)   Infrastructure assumes greater importance in trade in services. Under ASCM public 
investments in general infrastructure such as ports and airports is not considered to 
be  a  subsidy.  However,  in  case  of  GATS  such  investments  can  no  longer  be 
considered  as  those  in  general  infrastructure.  Definition  of  infrastructure  needs 
revision;  
 
d)   In keeping with the underlying spirit of ASCM, refund of all indirect taxes and 
levies on goods and services at any stage of generation of services that are traded 
should not be treated as subsidies. But clear identification of taxes (both on goods 
and services) used in the production of services may pose a challenge; 
 
e)   The disciplines imposed on subsidies to services will undergo a change. To the 
extent non-specific subsidies that are given more generally on economy-wide basis 
are  least  trade  distortionary,  the  distinction  between  specific  and  non-specific 
subsidies is desirable. While specific subsidies are more trade distortionary than   21 
non-specific  subsidies,  specific  subsidies  have  an  overwhelming  role  in  GATS 
because  of  the  need  to  fulfill  certain  public  policy  goals.
9  Under  certain 
circumstances  achieving  these  goals  may  call  for  giving  specific  subsidies. 
Therefore discipline on specific subsidies in services needs to be different from that 
in ASCM. Again, in case of services the traffic light approach of ASCM is not very 
helpful: one, because the distinction between export subsidies (measures contingent 
on export performance or on the use of domestic inputs over imported inputs) and 
other actionable subsidies gets blurred, and two, because of the limited scope of 
remedial action. That the subsidy regime should place more emphasis on disciplines 
to  control  the  behaviour  of  members  ex  ante  than  on  developing  rules  and 
procedures for ex post remedial action by members has been widely acknowledged 
in the literature. It is perhaps desirable to have only two kinds of subsidies: those 
that are permissible and those that are not; 
 
(f)  Subsidies agreement should allow for consumption support to nationals who are not 
able to afford a service otherwise, provided the consumption support is not linked to 
purchase  decision.  The  consumption  support  need  not  be  extended  to  foreign 
nationals; 
 
(g)   Just as subsidised goods and services that go into production of export goods and 
fall under the purview of ASCM, subsidised goods and services that enter into the 
production  of  exported  services  should  be  subjected  to  subsidy  disciplines  in 
GATS; 
 
(h)   cross-subsidy  requirement  imposed  by  regulator  to  achieve  universal  service 
obligations should be kept outside the purview of subsidy disciplines. However, 
                                                 
9 Under ASCM, subsidies given for achieving three public policy objectives were deemed non-actionable. 
These  public  policy  objectives  are:  research  and  development,  development  of  backward  regions,  and 
achieving environmental goals.   22 
subsidies disciplines would be applicable to a measure taken to achieve universal 
service obligations if that measure qualifies as subsidy;
10 
 
(i)   Special  and  differential  treatment  for  developing  countries.  For  developing 
countries  exclusive  reliance  on  laissez-faire  is  a  very  poor  option,  given  the 
underdevelopment  of  market  forces,  institutions,  and  national  private  economic 
agents.  According  to  UNCTAD  2005,  “…a  certain  level  of  interventionist, 
proactive industrial policies, which usually entail the implementation of selective 
subsidy  policies  as  a  key  component,  is  a  key  ingredient  of  any  development 
strategy…” Given the important role subsidy often play in developing countries, it 
is perhaps necessary to extend some kind of special and differential treatment to 
these countries. 
 
In  WTO,  for  the  present  the  aim  of  developing  subsidy  disciplines  is  not  to 
discipline all subsidies but only those subsidies that are trade distortionary. Indeed, the link 
between  trade  distortion  and  competition  distortion  is much  complex  in  services.  Even 
though  no  good  real  life  example  has  been  analysed  with  the  view  to  bring  out  trade 
distortionary effects of subsidies in services, it is not hard to imagine trade distortion that 
occurs when subsidies, say cash grants/transfers, are given to service producers or when 
infrastructure in a particular sector is subsidised by a government. Consider, for example, 
tourism sector which is one of the most commonly subsidised sector. Nobody would doubt 
that  international  tourists  take  account  of  the  cost  of  travel  and  stay  in  deciding  what 
country  destination  to  travel  to.  Accordingly,  subsidies  given  by  a  government  to  the 
different entities in its tourism industry would affect the costs and hence the number of 
tourist arrival in the country. Such subsidies even when available to foreign supplier under 
mode 3 would distort trade via mode 2 i.e., consumption abroad. To that extent there is a 
need to check subsidies. But such subsidies are hard to check. For example, it is quite 
                                                 
10  On  the  universal  service  obligation,  the  reference  paper  on  telecommunications  services  says,  “Any 
member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes to maintain. Such obligations 
will  not  be  regarded  as  anti-competitive  per  se,  provided  they  are  administered  in  a  transparent,  non-
discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of 
universal service defined by the member.” 
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difficult to de-link the benefits reaped by foreign tourist and domestic tourists. Further if 
subsidy takes the form of market assistance, say for publishing a country brochure that 
promotes tourism in the country, and if such assistance is given with the view to generate 
greater overall revenue to the government or generate employment in the sector it, is not 
clear if such subsidies at all need to be controlled/regulated. Could it be that consumption 
abroad is special to tourism sector alone? If that is so, should there be some sector specific 
subsidy disciplines? These are some of the issues that come up in thinking about subsidies 
disciplines in GATS. 
 
However,  many  WTO  members  are  of  the  view  that  in trying  to  make  a  small 
beginning  in  controlling  subsidies,  the  focus  initially  could  be  on  identifying  a  subset 
subsidy practices or measures that are most trade distortionary. Some guidance on this can 




The  developed  economies  are  mainly  services  economies  but  services  are 
increasingly playing important role both in its contribution to GDP and employment even 
in the poorest countries. In 2001, service sectors accounted for 45% of GDP in low-income 
economies;  57%  in  middle-income;  and  almost  71%  in  high-income  (Marchetti  2004). 
With the rising incomes, services would play increasingly important role in the economies 
of developing countries. Trade in services is expected to be a major driver of growth in 
world trade in the coming years (Rashmi 2005). Therefore, various government practices 
affecting trade in services, including subsidies, will increasingly come under the scrutiny of 
member countries. 
 
For  developing  limited  disciplines,  it  is  instructive  to  look  at  whatever  limited 
evidence  is  available  on  subsidies  in  services  sectors.  There  are  five  main  sources  of 
information on subsidies: (i) the information compiled by the WTO secretariat from the 
Trade  Policy  Reviews  (ii)  limitation  on  subsidies  under  national  treatment  sought  by 
member countries (iii) the findings of UNCTAD study on the subject (iv) EU survey on 
State Aid (v) analyse information on subsidies in selected sectors and in selected countries   24 
Additionally, we use information on the commitments made by the member countries in 
GATS. We turn to each of these pieces of information below. 
 
(i)  Information on subsidies in services sectors contained in WTO trade policy review 
is compiled in the most recent WTO document (S/WPGR/W/25/Add. 4) throws 
some light on subsidies in services sectors. 
 
The secretariat note indicates that the majority of subsidies took the form of tax 
incentives, duty-free inputs and free zone incentives as well as preferential credit, 
sometimes  linked  to  exports.  In  the  banking  sector,  for  example,  33  member 
countries provided subsidies, often in the form of tax incentives. In addition, 24 
member governments provided subsidies to the transport sector in general, 25 to 
maritime transport in particular, 14 to air transport, and 14 to rail transport. The 
note  also  listed  subsidies  in  such  sectors  as  energy,  telecommunications, 
construction, software and information technology. 
 
The note covered the 26 TPR reports issued since the last update in August 2002. In 
terms of the findings the note highlighted that tax incentives were the preferred tool 
to subsidise and that subsidies were generally found in all sectors, but mainly in 
tourism, transport, and banking. 
 
To see if there is any distinct pattern in subsidies across different member countries, 
we group this information in 3 sets of countries: the OECD countries, developing 
countries (i.e., annex VII countries), and the least developed countries (LDCs). This 
categorization  yields  some  interesting  results  which  are  contained  in  Tables  1 
through 3. 
 
Table 1 pertains to OECD countries. Along vertical axis we list different services 
sectors; horizontal axis lists different forms that subsidies can take. Number in each 
cell  denotes  number  of  member  countries  giving  subsidies.  For  example,  in  air 
transport  service  two  countries  gave  direct  grants.  Maritime  transport  sector   25 
received subsidies from maximum number of countries. This is followed by tourism 
and then banking. Direct grants were the most common form that subsidies take and 
this was followed by tax incentives. 
 
As far as developing countries are concerned the most common sector receiving 
subsidies is tourism; this is followed by maritime transport. Tax incentive is the 
most  common  form  of  subsidies  (see  Table  2).  For  least  developed  countries, 
tourism  sector  receives  maximum  subsidies  and  this  is  followed  by  “other  and 
unspecified” sectors. The most common form of subsidies is duty free inputs/free 
zones which is followed by tax incentives (see Table 3).
11 
 
It is important to be aware of the limitations of these findings of the Secretariat note 
prepared from the information contained in TPR. For example, the TPR reports tend 
to  focus  on  certain  sectors  more  than  on  others,  and  to  that  extent  it  lacks 
comprehensive sectoral focus of subsidies. Another limitation is that TPR reports 
were  prepared  with  a  broader  focus  in  mind,  and  therefore,  information  on 
particular subsidy programs is often quite limited and made classifications difficult. 
The overview provided by the secretariat should be seen as best estimate on the 
basis of limited information. Moreover, the note did not address the issue of trade 
distortive subsidy. Therefore, being listed as a donor of subsidies did not imply any 
wrong-doing. 
 
(ii)  A note prepared by the WTO secretariat contains information on limitations in 
members’  schedules  relating  to  subsidies  (S/WPGR/W/13  and  addenda). 
Information  contained  is  not  complete  as  only  those  entries  that  make  explicit 
reference to subsidies, grants, financial support, aid or assistance are included in the 
listing  of  measures.  Furthermore,  subsidies  may  also  be  granted  in  cases  where 
sectors  or  activities  have  been  excluded  from  members’  schedules  of  specific 
                                                 
11 These broad patterns are visible in the earlier WTO compilation of information based on TPRs. 
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commitments,  or  where  a  particular  mode  of  supply  has  not  been  bound  with 
respect to market access and/or national treatment. 
 
In the secretariat note on subsidy-related entries in schedules, while not providing 
much information on definition, revealed certain policy intentions. For example, in 
mode 3, only those companies that were present on the territory were eligible for 
subsidies. In mode 4, only citizens and/or residents were eligible. Things were less 
clear for modes 1 and 2. The entries also highlighted the sectors and areas that were 
of  particular  concern  to  some  members,  such  as  research  and  development, 
audiovisual, and education. Requesting detailed information from member countries 
on subsidies to these sectors is a good starting point. 
 
(iii)  In the analysis done by UNCTAD, developing countries have potential comparative 
advantage,  particularly  through  movement  of  natural  persons,  in  at  least  six 
different  sectors.  These  are:  professional  and  business  services,  health  services, 
tourism, construction, audiovisual services and transport. If trade expansion based 
on comparative advantage is to be advanced, subsidy disciplines in these sectors 
need to be developed before progress is made on developing full blown subsidy 
disciplines. 
 
It would be interesting to know whether members detecting distortions caused by 
subsidies  or  proposing  relevant  disciplines  had  made  use  of  the  consultations 
provisions  of  Article  XV:2,  thus  indicating  that  they  considered  themselves 
adversely  affected  by  a  subsidy  of  another  member.  This  would  then  constitute 
fourth  source  of  information  that  would  shed  some  light  specifically  on  trade 
distorting subsidies. 
 
A recent UNCTAD study (2005) on subsidies to services sectors makes a number of 
interesting  observations.  For  example,  global  subsidies  are  more  than  a  trillion 
dollars per year or 4 percent of world GDP, and OECD countries spend twice as 
much on subsidies in relation to developing countries but much less in proportion to   27 
GDP. Apart from agriculture, the three most subsidized sectors all involve services: 
water, energy, and road transport. These three services sectors absorb almost half of 
total subsidies worldwide and an even higher share in non-OECD countries. Citing 
other estimates, the UNCTAD study suggests R&D to be another area of public 
support. Total OECD expenditure on R&D (public as well as private) was over 
US$551 billion in 2000. The share of US was 44 per cent, EU 28 percent, and Japan 
17 per cent. The share of R&D performed directly by governments is about 10%. It 
is particularly low in the US (7.5 % and higher in EU (almost 14%). Most OECD 
countries are increasing public funding for R&D and innovations. The EU has set a 
goal of earmarking 3% of GDP for R&D by 2010. South Korea is determined to 
increase  government  R&D  expenditure  to  5%  of  the  total  government  budget. 
Indeed, subsidy for R&D activities is one area where most developed countries 
have sought limitations under national treatment. 
 
(iv)  Ninth Survey on State Aid in the European Union 
 
The importance of the service sector in EU and state aid given to this sector is 
summed in the 9
th survey on state aid in the EU: “The European Union is a service-
driven economy. The commercial service sector accounts for a large proportion of 
total GDP and this proportion is even larger when social and public services are 
included. Given the importance of services, a growing emphasis is being put on the 
analysis of aid granted in this sector and contingent upon information provided by 
Member States, a more detailed picture of the trends and patterns in the grant of aid 
will be presented in future.” 
 
In 1997-99, average annual state aid given to all sectors (including manufacturing 
and agriculture) by the EU was Euro 90 billion or Euro 240 per capita. State aid 
accounted for about 1.18 per cent of GDP and 2.44 per cent of total government 
expenditure. 
   28 
During  the  same  period,  around  42  percent  of  state  aid  to  all  sectors  went  to 
transport sector (36%) and services sector (6%). In transport sector majority of aid 
went to railways and none to airline services. 
 
The survey report observes, “Whilst in comparison with other sectors, the overall 
levels of aid [to services] are not massive, the importance of aid in this sector is due 
to  the  fact  that  the  bulk  of  the  aid  is  ad-hoc  aid  granted  to  a  small  number  of 
companies. For this reason government support to this sector must be kept under 
constant watch and all current restructuring operations will continue to be closely 
monitored.  This  is  particularly  important  where  capital  injections  or  equivalent 
forms of aid have a direct impact on the beneficiaries’ operations, and may distort 
competition far beyond what would be expected if only the nominal value of the aid 
were taken in to consideration.” In 1997-99, annual average aid given to service on 
ad-hoc basis was Euro 3,655 million. 
 
Between 1995-97 and 1997-99, there has been an increase in aid to service sector 
from 5 billion to 5.4 billion. But restructuring of certain service industries such as 
airlines and finance appears to be winding down following the relatively  recent 
liberalisation of these sectors. 
 
(v)  Subsidies in Selected Sectors
12 
 
Tourism is the world’s largest and one of the fastest growing sectors. It accounts for 
over one-third of the value of total world-wide services trade (S/C/W/51). Being 
labour    intensive, the industry has significant employment generator and hence of 
great interest to developing countries. Tourism is also highly perishable commodity 
in the sense of unsold airline seats, hotel rooms etc. have no residual value. The 
industry is infrastructure intensive, and is greatly influenced by immigration and 
                                                 
12 The author gratefully acknowledges the help of Dr. Arpita Mukherjee and Dr. Rupa Chanda for the 
information on subsidies in selected sectors.   29 
entry/exit controls. The industry is broadly divided into 4 subsectors: hotels and 
restaurants, travel agencies and tour operators, tourist guides and others. 
 
 
Many countries provide incentives to promote the development of tourism industry. 
These include France, Malaysia, India, Singapore, USA and UK. Tax incentive is 
the most common form. But countries like Malaysia also provides variety of non-
tax  breaks  such  as  export  credit  refinancing  facility,  export  credit  insurance 
guarantees,  special  funds  to  be  used  for  specific  purposes,  concessional  price 
charged for land. France, for example, provides grants to improve the accessibility 
of geographical regions such as Reunion. Singapore also enables cheap flights to 
attract business visitors to certain locations. To reduce the burden on employers’ 
Singapore  provides  training  grant.  It  also  assists  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises in the sector to alleviate the short-term cash flows. 
 
Special incentives are given in the event of any catastrophic event such as the 9/11, 
outbreak of SARS, tsunami and so forth. Singapore helps the industry to upgrade by 
assisting them to engage approved professional conference organizers to organize 
international  association  meetings.  The  incentives  come  from  both  federal 
government  and  provincial  government.  In  USA  each  of  the  50  states  has 
established an official government-sponsored office or bureau to promote tourism. 
USA has Visa waiver program to enable citizens of certain countries to travel to 
USA for tourism or business for 90 days or less without obtaining visa. 
 
Even in as dynamic and commercial sector as telecommunication, we do find some 
subsidy program in existence. In USA for example, a number of direct mechanisms 
that target both service providers and subscribers to telecommunication services. 
Whether these programs are consistent with the USO as outlined in the Annex to 
the Telecommunication sector in the WTO needs to be verified. In this sector, direct 
funding for Research and Development is common in many countries. Malaysia 
provides fiscal incentives to promote investments and reinvestments in this sector.   30 
China provides low interest loans, discounted tax rates, makes generous provision 
of land in high-technology parks. India provides preferential credit and guarantees, 
loans  to  service  providers  like  BSNL  and  so  forth.  In  Singapore,  government 
provides  subsidized  loans,  supports  training  and  human  resource  programs, 
reimburses trade promotion costs incurred by firms, and tax incentives to exporters. 
 
Social services such as healthcare
13, serve important developmental, distributional, 
and  other  objectives.  Accordingly,  “such  services  may  be  core  instruments  in 
pursuit  of  social  and  distributional  justice  or  could  be  viewed  as  important 
contributors to, or preconditions for, economic development.” As a result, “Health 
and social services are subject to panoply of economic and non-economic goals, 
influences and constraints.” 
 
In  social  sectors  such  as  healthcare  government  has  a  strong  presence  in  most 
member  countries.  In  Canada,  for  example,  government  provides  subsidies  to 
promote public health care in less prosperous provinces, for research and innovation 
in  health  and  on  health  information,  for  professional  training,  public  health 
research, control of certain diseases such as cancer, to improve Canada’s readiness 
to deal with public emergencies.  
 
In China,  government spends on national disease prevention and  control centre, 
local  disease  prevention  projects  etc.  India  spends  on  national  disease  control 
programs  including  HIV/AIDS,  for  implementing  family  planning  program,  for 
providing primary health care as well as secondary and tertiary care. In Philippines 
subsidy is given to implement sector reforms program, to provide universal health 
insurance.  In  South  Africa  government  provides  subsidies  to  facilitate  primary 
health care, to enable lower income groups to avail of health care facilities and to 
facilitate medical care in remote areas. 
                                                 
13 In the WTO listing, the definition of health-related and social services does not include medical and dental 
services,  veterinary  services  and  services  provided  by  nurses,  midwives  etc.,  which  have  been  grouped 
separately under professional services. 
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In UK, government spends on national health service (NHS), supports primary care 
trusts, invests in selected projects such as tackling obesity among children etc. In 
USA, government supports medicaid and medicare, it encourages construction of 
hospitals, invests in research and development, and in certain types of ailments. 
 
In healthcare, subsidies are given to improve both supply and demand, especially 
for certain income and/or age groups, and to improve supply especially in rural and 
remote areas. Government invests in training and research, and in collecting and 
disseminating  health  information.  Government  also  invests  in  prevention  and 
promotion of health care. It invests in control of certain diseases at national level, in 
family planning methods in certain developing countries facing population pressure, 
for capacity building in handling national emergencies/crisis and so forth. 
 
While health and social services have long been considered as non-tradeables to be 
provided by public institutions there has been a change in policy perception in a 
number of countries. More efficient transport and communication technologies have 
enhanced the mobility of both professionals and consumers and enabled the use of 
new modes of supply, overturning traditional concepts of space and distance. A 
WTO publication points out the increasing importance of cross-border supply of 
medical services such as telemedicine. There is a significant potential for cross-
border trade in healthcare (S/C/W/50). From trade perspective, the discussions are 
focused not on constraining the ability of  government to meet  equity  and other 
social objectives but to enhance efficiency in its provision. 
 
Transport sector is one of the heavily subsidised services sector both in developed 
and developing countries. Universal service obligation (USO) is common to rail, 
road, and air transport services. Rail, air, and maritime transport, however, receive 
more subsidies than road transport. Subsidies take variety of forms. One form of 
subsidy  that  is  common  to  all  transport  sectors  is  creation  of  sector  specific 
infrastructure. This usually takes the form of direct budgetary support by way of   32 
grants  or  concessional  loans.  In  addition,  subsidy  also  takes  the  form  of  loan 
guarantees,  concessional  land,  equity  infusions,  and  tax  incentives,  and  cross-
subsidy between passenger and freight. 
 
Sometimes subsidy is also given for activities like research and development, to 
compensate  catastrophic  loss  arising  out  of  unforeseen  event  such  as  terrorism 
strike etc, tax free allowance to encourage use of trains among people, zero taxation 
on fuel used in air transport or launch aid. 
 
Audio visual sector is also one of the heavily subsidised sectors; and subsidies in 
this sector are prominent in nearly every stage of the production and distribution 
process. It is subsidised more in developed countries than in developing countries 
(Bernier  2003).  The  stated  objectives  for  giving  subsidies  and  other  incentives 
differ  from  country  to  country.  For  example,  in  France  subsidies  are  aimed  at 
preservation of culture’s independence and diversity, unity and prestige. In United 
Kingdom, tax incentives are given to promote growth, employment, and investment 
and also to facilitate structural change to meet global competition. In EU, subsidy is 
given to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic film industry. In Italy subsidies 
are given promote cinematographic activities, including film industry events, public 
institutions,  and  professional  associations,  screenplay  awards,  conversation  of 
archives and publications. In Germany, subsidies are given to films that promote 
German  culture  and  language.  The  Indian  government  provides  subsidies  to 
preserve and promote its rich cultural heritage. In  India, subsidies are given for 
construction of theatre/multiplexes and for promoting and hunting national talent. 
Elsewhere,  subsidies  are  given  for  audiovisual  production  and  distribution, 
generation  of  employment  in  the  industry  and  so  forth.  This  is  one  of  the  two 
sectors that have drawn maximum number of exemption to MFN obligation by the 
member countries. 
 
Subsidies are given through automatic as well as selective or discretionary way. 
Subsidies take variety of forms: outright grants, soft loan, indirect support by way   33 
of making the public facilities available at concessional price, fiscal incentives, and 
guarantee fund, soft loans. India gives television segment and film segment. Fiscal 
incentives such as tax shelter on reinvestment of profits, rebate on box-office taxes, 
tax  allowances  for  the  purchase  or  restructuring  of  cinema  theatres,  facilitating 
transition from analogue to digital terrestrial. Subsidies are provided by national as 
well as by provincial government for, say promotion of regional films. In Egypt 
there is local content requirement in case of foreign films that are shot in Egypt. 
 
(vi)  Commitments in GATS 
 
It  might  be  useful  to  look  at  the  commitments  made  by  member  countries  in 
GATS.
14  With  the  exception  of  tourism  that  has  drawn  the  highest  number  of 
commitments,  the  focus  in  sector  commitments  tends  to  be  on  infrastructure 
(producer)  related  sectors  i.e.,  financial  services,  a  diverse  range  of  business 
services, and telecommunications. These services have two common characteristics: 
one, their exposure to rapid technical change and two, their potential impact on 
efficiency and competitiveness across wide range of user industries. 
 
Developing countries have scheduled far less sectors than developed countries. The 
only sectors which have not been committed by a significant number of developed 
members are other communication services (postal and courier services, and audio 
visual services) as well as health and education services. These sectors have been 
shunned completely by a significant number of developed countries. 
 
Other observations made about the commitments are that horizontal limitations are 
generally  more  frequent  than  sector  specific  entries.  In  particular,  limitations 
relating to subsidies, tax measures, land ownership or land use tend to be horizontal, 
while nationality and residency requirements as well as a residual category of other 
financial measures are often scheduled in a sector specific context. 
 
                                                 
14 This section is drawn from Adlung and Roy (2005), Adlung, R., (2004), Marchetti (2004).   34 
It  may  be  argued  that  typically  horizontal  measures  such  as  denial  of  land 
ownership or discriminatory subsidization are less trade-restrictive in practice, and 
thus less relevant for negotiations than many sector specific measures. As far as 
subsidies are concerned, it appears safe to assume that these are especially relevant 
in sectors such as education, health and social services which are considered public 
sector  domains  in  most  countries.  Negotiating  pressures  may  continue  to  be 
comparatively low in such sectors. 
 
It is also worth noting that transport sector and audio-visual sector are also the two 
sectors that have drawn exemption to MFN obligation (as per first MFN review in 




According to a WTO study, “An MFN exemption is a deviation only  from the 
obligations in Article II, and cannot be used to escape obligations deriving from 
specific commitments undertaken under Articles XVI and XVII. In other words, the 
level of market access and national treatment bound in a schedule has to be granted 
as a minimum to all WTO members and commitments cannot be undercut e.g., by 
way of reciprocity conditions through MFN exemptions. In turn, this means that the 
deeper  the  commitments  in  a  given  sector,  the  more  limited  the  discrimination 
potential of an MFN exemption. Viewed in this light, the distortion potential of 
MFN exemptions is greatest in sectors such as audiovisual and transport services, 
where the number of exemptions is highest relative to the number of commitments.” 
 
The overall picture that emerges from the above empirical evidence on subsidies is 
that while subsidies are fairly widespread in all service sectors, some sectors are 
subsidised more than others. Although the subsidy information available is partial 
(pertaining to selected sectors, in selected countries and limited in details), it is 
reasonable to believe that social sectors receive more subsidies than commercial 
                                                 
15 New members can seek MFN exemptions at the time of accession and the current members can be granted 
waiver under article IX:3 of the WTO agreement.   35 
sectors. Given a strong rationale for government support in social services, it is 
probably better to focus on subsidies being given in non-social sectors. 
 
Tourism is one sector that has drawn maximum commitments by member countries 
and, at the same time, it is subsidized by most member countries. Financial sector is 
another sector that has drawn higher commitments from member countries. Banking 
sector,  which  is  part  of  financial  sector,  is  also  subsidized  especially  by  the 
developed member countries. It is common understanding that social services such 
as education and healthcare are also heavily subsidized sectors across developed 
and developing countries but these are also the sectors in which the commitments 
made even by developed member countries are minimal. Audio-visual and transport 
sectors (rail transport in particular) are also subsidised to a considerable extent. 
These  are  also  the  sectors  on  which  even  MFN  exemption  is  sought  by  many 
member  countries.  Direct  grant  is  the  most  favoured  subsidy  route  in  OECD 
member countries. Subsidy being a horizontal measure is less trade distortionary 
than sector specific limitation and hence negotiating pressures on subsidies may be 
comparatively weak. 
 
A Case of Limited Subsidy Disciplines 
 
The idea behind limited disciplines is not to tackle all trade distorting public support 
program in services sectors but to advance discussions on only those programs that are 
perceived to be most trade distortionary. The literature dealing with developing subsidy 
disciplines in GATS deals with the whole gamut of issues that are to be dealt with in 
developing  full-blown  subsidy  framework  in  case  of  services.  The  need  for  such  a 
framework is not denied. But many members favour taking a piecemeal approach, making 
a modest beginning, rather than developing full framework. While subsidy disciplines in 
services will no doubt enable member countries to achieve greater progress under GATS by 
making  greater  commitments,  the  present  need  for  having  subsidy  disciplines  is 
necessitated by the undermining of market access commitments when a member country 
subsidise service supplied in the third country market. The need for subsidies disciplines is   36 
also heightened by the relatively low ability of developing country members to subsidise 
services  especially  in  areas  in  which  they  have  a  comparative  advantage.  Lack  of 
information on the subsidies that are being given by different member countries to different 
services  sector  is  acting  as  a  major  stumbling  block  in  achieving  even  this  limited 
objective. However, the discussion on the framework can continue alongside such modest 
beginning. For taking a small step, the definition of subsidies in GATT is considered to be 
a good starting point by the member countries. 
 
Limited Subsidy Disciplines and Market Access: It is increasingly becoming clear that the 
issue of subsidies cannot be separated from market access issue. When a member makes 
full market access commitments and does not seek any limitations, member cannot offer 
discriminatory subsidies. Foreign suppliers established in the territory will be given the 
same access as domestic suppliers. To this extent competition in the home market is not 
distorted.  But  the  problem  is  that  the  competition  may  get  distorted  in  a  third  market. 
Domestic companies in the third market may face unfair competition from abroad. The 
same is true of service suppliers from any other member countries that export services to 
the third market. If competition in the third market is distorted by subsidized suppliers of 
other  member  countries,  it  would  tend  to  diminish  the  value  of  new  market  access 
commitments. In this sense the subsidy disciplines and market access commitments are 
interlinked.  The  subsidy  disciplines  should  seek  to  address  all  trade  distortive  effects, 
including those in the third country market. However, as a priority the members want the 
third  market  effect  to  be  tackled  before  all  trade  distortive  effects  of  subsidies  are 
eventually addressed. Even regional or bilateral trade agreements cannot effectively deal 
with issues such as effects in third markets. 
 
The piecemeal approach could be one that addresses certain forms of subsidies to 
certain sectors and under certain modes only, depending on who the beneficiaries are, and 
what are the effects on trade. The process then reduces to identifying these forms, sectors, 
and modes. With the present level of information, one can make the following points: 
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(i)  All firm specific subsidies in basic infrastructure sectors especially in financial 
and telecommunications sectors could be targeted initially; 
(ii)  Some discipline on subsidy practices in sectors in which higher commitments 
have been made such as tourism (financial and telecommunication also happens 
to be sectors in which higher commitments have been made); 
(iii)  Subsidy  measures  specifically  targeted  at  firms  engaged  in  earning  foreign 
exchange through services export; 
(iv)  Consumption support that is tied to a service supplier could be disciplined; 
(v)  Certain kinds of subsidies that take the form of export guarantees and export 
credit/loans  extended  to  any  service  sector  would  most  certainly  be  trade 
distortionary and should be restricted; likewise benefits accorded to outbound 
foreign direct investment could be disciplined; 
(vi)  Transport sector receives significant level of support from government but its 
trade distortionary potential remains to be established; 
(vii)  Social  sectors  such  as  health  and  education  that  have  attracted  minimal 




Whether these limited subsidy disciplines, which would focus on the most trade 
distorting subsidy practices, be applied only to sectors in which commitments have been 
made or should these be also applicable to sectors in which members have not made any 
commitments remains an open issue. If the latter is followed, it would tend to go against 
the basic spirit of GATS that accords almost full flexibility with respect to commitments 




Since  the  extent  of  trade  distortion  in  a  given  sector  would  also  depend  on 
secondary effects of a subsidy program, which could be different in different sectors, it 
may be advisable to start with a sub-sector that feeds into other services sectors. In this   38 
context,  any  subsidy  given  to  essentially  intermediate  sectors---financial,  transport  and 
telecommunication services--- would trickle down to many other sectors and sub-sectors. 
For example, a subsidy to the banking sector would indirectly benefit other sectors by 
reducing interest rates on credit. Categorizing services sectors into main sub-groups and 
having a study done on trade impacts on each sub-group might help to advance discussions. 
The level of restrictions could then be determined for each sub-group. The use of sub-
groups  could  also  be  useful  for  considering  public  policy  objectives,  which  are  more 
prominent in some sub-sectors. Likewise, certain types of infrastructure created for the 
broad societal welfare of a country, region, state or municipality should not be subject to 
subsidy  disciplines.  This  category  includes,  for  example,  interstate  highways,  schools, 
health care facilities, sewage systems or police protection, assuming they were provided for 
the public good and where available to all citizens on the same terms. 
 
Sharing of information on ad hoc subsidy programs and sector specific program 
must be made obligatory. The GATS mandate clearly entails an obligation to exchange 
information  concerning  all  subsidies  related  to  trade  in  services.  Since  information  on 
subsidies programs maintained by member countries is not forthcoming, many member 
countries  (Switzerland,  Hong  Kong,  Chile  and  others)  have  suggested  that  the  only 
practical way to progress on this matter is to set a concrete time frame for exchange of 
information.  As  for  the  difficulty  cited  by  member  countries  that  absence  of  a  clear 
definition of subsidy is coming in the way in furnishing information on subsidy programs, 




In the absence of information no generalized subsidy control by either prohibiting 
any new subsidy or expansion of existing subsidies is possible. Such a generalized control, 
for example, is included in subsidy disciplines relating to services in the Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement (ANZCERTA). Article 11 of the protocol 
                                                 
16 It is interesting to note that more than 35 members had entered limitations regarding subsidies. The fact that 
absence  of  an  agreed  definition  of  subsidy  did  not  seem  to  pose  problems  for  the  scheduling  and 
implementation of these limitations, gives an impression that absence of definition is only being used as an 
excuse.    39 
on trade in services under the agreement prohibited members from introducing new or 
expanding  existing  export  subsidies,  export  incentives  and  other  assistance  measures 
having  a  direct  distorting  effect  on  trade.  Action  under  the  subsidy  disciplines  in  the 
ANZCERTA had never been invoked. 
 
To begin with, having an illustrative list along the lines of that in ASCM is not a 
bad idea. In fact, even in goods case, during the Tokyo Round, an illustrative list of export 
subsidies was developed, without having a definition of subsidies and other disciplines on 
subsidies. 
 
Policy  goals  notwithstanding,  subsidies  alter  the  conditions  of  competition  and 
interfere with price signals. Nevertheless, the effects depend on the form of subsidy, the 
market structure, the eligibility conditions, and how they interact with other policies. For 
example,  trade  distortions  seem  more  likely  when  the  recipient  of  a  subsidy  was  a 
significant player in the market. At present, the scope of services sectors defined in GATS 
included a wide range of enterprises, from small-sized firms to multinational companies. In 
case of limited subsidy disciplines, its scope can be reduced to cases where the recipient of 
a subsidy is a significant player in the market. 
 
Tax regimes within a sector or sub-sector should be harmonized. For example, same 
tax treatment of road transport and transport by rail. Differential tax treatment tends to 
distort supply of services at a sub-sector level. It could also distort trade under certain 
conditions, for example, when domestic suppliers have a strong presence in a favoured sub-
sector even when the sector is open to competition. 
 
Given the complexity of issues, one possible approach, similar to the EC approach, 
is  to  define  subsidies  and  then,  assuming  that  subsidies  in  general  alter  conditions  of 
competition, impose a general prohibition on the use of subsidies while allowing for their 
use  for  certain  well  defined  policy  objectives.  For  this  an  exhaustive  list  of  policy 
objectives may be prepared which may then be linked with the instruments in such a way   40 
that the instruments used to achieve policy goals are least competition distortionary. This, 
of course, is possible in a full blown subsidy agreement in services. 
 
Any subsidy disciplines would by definition limit the ability of member countries to 
provide subsidies. An important issue here is whether the limited disciplines should be 
applicable only to those sectors in which members have made commitment and not sought 
subsidy limitation or should it also be applicable to sectors in which members have not 
scheduled commitments. In developing limited disciplines, it is probably a good idea to 




Based on foregone analysis certain points are quite revealing: subsidies are quite 
widespread  in  a  range  of  service  sectors  both  in  developed  and  developing  countries. 
Subsidy definition given in ASCM can be extended to services. Furthermore, to the extent 
non-specific  subsidies  that  are  available  on  an  economy  wide  basis  are  least  trade 
distortionary, the distinction between specific and non-specific subsidy is desirable even in 
case  of  services.  But  further  disciplines  on  subsidies  would  undergo  necessary 
modification. The need for modification is due to the fact that trade in services can occur 
through other channels/modes and also the fact that scope of countervailing duties as a 
remedy is quite limited in services as compared to the goods case. A 2-way classification of 
subsidies (classified as prohibited and non-prohibited) would be more relevant compared to 
3-way  classification  (prohibited,  actionable  and  non-actionable)  of  subsidies  in  case  of 
goods.  While  national  treatment  imposes  significant  discipline  on  subsidy  practices  of 
member countries in service sector, there are a few channels through which subsidies can 
still distort trade and competition. There is a need to make progress on the scope of article 
I:3(b) i.e., on the services provided in exercise of governmental authority. Owing to the 
strong government presence in certain social sectors, a clearer understanding on the scope 
of  GATS  is  needed  if  subsidies  in  such  sectors  are  to  be  brought  within  subsidies 
framework in GATS. 
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Subsidy  disciplines  should  continue  to  uphold  the  flexibility  given  to  member 
countries in GATS. There is a need to discipline subsidies given to service sector even after 
a member countries have extended national treatment to foreign suppliers as such subsidies 
can potentially distort trade/competition across subsectors as also across modes. Here EU 
approach  appears  useful.  The  EU  allows  subsidies  to  achieve  certain  well  defined 
objectives. Even then, we find EU member countries provide significant level of subsidy to 
transport and other services sectors. Of course, EU approach is relevant for developing full 
blown subsidy disciplines. A limited progress in developing subsidy disciplines suggested 
in  the  paper  could  includes  steps  such  as  prohibition  of  firm  specific  subsidy  in 
infrastructure  services,  especially  in  financial  and  telecommunications;  allowing  sector 
specific subsidies in sectors in which higher commitments have been made by member 
countries, control over consumption subsidies that are linked to purchase decisions. It is 
prudent to restrict selected most trade distorting subsidies and  gradually move towards 
developing full scale subsidy disciplines.   42 
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Figure 1: Subsidies in case of Merchandise 
1.1.2  Country A 
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measures  Total 
Air transport  2     1  1  1  3  8 
Audio-visual   4        2        6 
Banking  2  2  3  4        11 
Construction  2  1     3        6 
Energy  2        1     1  4 
Maritime transport  3  1     7  1  3  15 
Other & unspecified sectors  3  2  1  1     1  8 
Other financial services  1  1     3        5 
Rail transport  3        1     1  5 
Real estate  1        3        4 
Recreation, culture & sports  3        1        4 
Software and ITC  3        2        5 
Telecom  3                 3 
Transportation   5  1     2        8 
Wholesale & Retail, Dist.  1  1     1        3 
Tourism  5  3     2  1  2  13 
Total   43  12  5  34  3  11  108 
 
Source: WTO Report No. S/WPGR/W/Add.4 
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measures  Total 
Air transport           1     1  2 
Banking     2  2  2  1  1  8 
Construction           3  1     4 
Energy           3     2  5 
Maritime transport  2  1     4  3  1  11 
Other & unspecified sectors  1        3     2  6 
Other financial services     1        1     2 
Rail transport  2        1     3  6 
Real estate     1              1 
Recreation, culture & sports           4  2     6 
Software and ITC           4  2  1  7 
Telecom     1     1  1  1  4 
Transportation general or unspecified           3  1  2  6 
Wholesale & Retail, Dist.           1  1     2 
Tourism  2  3     13  8  2  28 
Total  7  9  2  43  21  16  98 
 
Source: WTO Report No. S/WPGR/W/Add.4   48 



















measures  Total  
Air transport           1  1     2 
Audio-visual services  1        1  2     4 
Banking           1  3     4 
Construction           1  2     3 
Energy           2  1  1  4 
Maritime transport  1                 1 
Other & unspecified sectors     2     1     4  7 
Other financial services              2     2 
Rail transport           1     2  3 
Recreation, culture & sports           2  2     4 
Software, ITC              2     2 
Telecom              2  2  4 
Transportation general or unspecified           2  1  1  4 
Wholesale & Retail, Dist.              2     2 
Tourism  1  1  1  8  10  3  24 
Total   3  3  1  20  30  13  70 
 
Source: WTO Report No. 
S/WPGR/W/Add.4               